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Abstract
We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when
monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incen-
tive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism
that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive com-
patibility. Further, we establish the uniqueness of the mechanism under an
order additivity condition. This result contrasts well with various results on
the incompatibility between efficiency and ex post incentive compatibility.
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary
transfers are possible. An important example of this problem is that of locating
a public facility (e.g., Kleindorfer and Serter, 1994; Sakai, 2008). When a region
accepts an undesirable public facility such as a garbage disposal facility, the region
must bear a disutility. Here, the problem is which region accepts the facility and
how much the site is fairly compensated by the others. Other examples are problems
of assigning a right or task.
We examine the existence of mechanisms to solve the fair division problem.1
We discuss this topic in an independent valuation model. In this paper, we mainly
consider the following three properties: (ex post) envy-freeness (Foley, 1967), (ex
post) budget balancedness2, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. In our model,
under budget balancedness, envy-freeness implies efficiency (Svensson, 1983).3 This
relation encourages us to study the fairness property. In this model, any efficient
mechanism is not strategy-proof (Holmstro¨m, 1979; Ohseto, 2000; Schummer, 2000).
By the logical relationship, any envy-free and budget balanced mechanism violates
strategy-proofness.4 Therefore, we consider Bayesian incentive compatibility, which
is a weaker condition than strategy-proofness.
We can establish an affirmative result. We propose a mechanism that satisfies
envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. Therefore,
we can achieve fairness as well as efficiency through this mechanism. This result
contrasts well with the impossibility results on strategy-proofness. Further, we for-
mulate order additivity as an auxiliary property. Since the monetary transfers in
order additive mechanisms are not dependent on the names of agents, the property
can be interpreted as a kind of anonymity condition. We establish the uniqueness
of the desirable mechanism under the order additivity condition. We also discuss an
extension of our results to the problem where there are two or more homogeneous
indivisible objects.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 introduces our model and the properties of mechanisms. Section 4 presents
our main results. Section 5 discusses an extension of our results. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 Related literature
On the basis of the impossibility results on strategy-proofness, many studies consider
weaker conditions and examine the compatibility among properties. If we give up
strategy-proofness or budget balancedness, positive results can be obtained: for ex-
1A mechanism is a function that associates each preference profile with an allocation. Therefore,
it is also considered as a social choice function or its associated direct revelation mechanism.
2Hereafter, we simply call these envy-freeness and budget balancedness.
3In this paper, efficiency means ex post Pareto efficiency.
4Tadenuma and Thomson (1995) directly prove this relation.
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ample, Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979) for efficiency and
Bayesian incentive compatibility,5 and Ohseto (2006) for envy-freeness and strategy-
proofness.6 On the other hand, we cannot overcome the impossibility under a weaker
fairness condition than envy-freeness, for example symmetry and the identical pref-
erences lower bound (Moulin, 1990)7; Ohseto (1999), Schummer (2000), Ando, Kato,
and Ohseto (2008), and Fujinaka and Sakai (2007b).
In this paper, we weaken strategy-proofness and establish a positive result. To
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first work to establish the compatibil-
ity among the three main properties in our independent valuation model. In this
model, Gu¨th and van Damme (1986) and Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987)
analyze envy-free and budget balanced mechanisms with simple monetary transfer
schemes, but the mechanisms are not Bayesian incentive compatible. Morgan (2004)
establishes the same compatibility in a common valuation model. However, his re-
sult cannot apply to our model since the random assignment of the object in his
mechanism violates efficiency.8
In a complete information model, we can obtain positive results and a key solu-
tion is the no-envy solution.9 The solution is the smallest among Nash implementable
solutions that satisfy weak symmetry and an independence property (Tadenuma and
Thomson, 1995; Sakai, 2007)10 and can be implemented in Nash equilibrium through
an envy-free and budget balanced mechanism with an auxiliary condition (Tadenuma
and Thomson, 1995; A¯zacis, 2008).11 Fujinaka and Sakai (2008b) propose an in-
direct mechanism that implements the solution in Nash equilibrium. The indirect
mechanism also implements the equal welfare mechanism (Tadenuma and Thomson,
1993) in undominated Nash equilibrium, although any fair mechanism is not Nash
implementable (Fujinaka and Sakai, 2007a).
Several studies examine the compatibility among efficiency, interim individual
rationality, and Bayesian incentive compatibility ; for example, Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983), Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987), and Fieseler, Kittsteiner,
and Moldovanu (2003). Muto and Oyama (2008) consider ex post individual ratio-
nality instead of the interim condition, and point out that the mechanism proposed
in our paper satisfies the ex post condition for the equal-share ownership setting.12
They discuss this topic in an interdependent valuation model by applying our mech-
5We can easily see that their mechanisms are not envy-free.
6Any of his mechanisms is not budget balanced since it is a Groves mechanism (Groves, 1973).
7Moulin (1990) and Bevia´ (1996) establish that under budget balancedness, envy-freeness implies
the identical preferences lower bound.
8This is because an agent whose valuation is not the highest may receive the object.
9The no-envy solution is a correspondence that associates each preference profile with the set
of all envy-free and budget balanced allocations.
10In non-quasi-linear environments, the no-envy solution is the only Nash implementable solution
that satisfies symmetry and an independence property (Sakai, 2007).
11Tadenuma and Thomson’s (1995) actual purpose is to analyze the degree of strategic manipula-
bility in envy-free and budget balanced mechanisms. The succeeding studies are Tatamitani (1994),
Bevia´ (2001), and Fujinaka and Sakai (2007b;2008a).
12This is because the identical preferences lower bound is equivalent to ex post individual ratio-
nality under budget balancedness.
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anism to the model.
3 Model
3.1 Basic notion
Let I ´ f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a finite set of the agents. There is one indivisible object to
be assigned to one of the agents. We assume that monetary transfers are possible.
Agent i has a valuation vi to the indivisible object. Let V ´ [v; v] with v < v
denote the set of agent i’s possible valuations. Each agent’s valuations are inde-
pendently and identically distributed on V according to the distribution function
F : V ! [0; 1]. Suppose that F admits the density function f ´ F 0 that satisfies
f(w) > 0 for each w 2 V . Let v = (v1; v2; : : : ; vn) be a valuation profile and VI be
the set of such profiles. Let v¡i = (v1; : : : ; vi¡1; vi+1; : : : ; vn) be a valuation profile
except for that of agent i and let V¡i be the set of such profiles, i.e., V¡i ´ VInfig.
We denote the joint density of v¡i 2 V¡i by f¡i(v¡i). Since the valuations are
independently distributed,
f¡i(v¡i) = f(v1)£ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ f(vi¡1)£ f(vi+1)£ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ f(vn) 8 v¡i 2 V¡i:
We assume that each agent privately knows his own valuation and only knows that
the other agents’ valuations are independently distributed according to F .
Agent i with valuation vi has a utility function u( ¢ ; vi) : f0; 1g £ R ! R such
that
u(xi; ti; vi) ´ xivi + ti:
xi = 1 (resp. xi = 0) represents that agent i receives (resp. does not receive) the
object. ti ¸ 0 (resp. ti < 0) is the amount of money he is paid (resp. pays). We
assume that each agent is risk neutral.
An assignment vector is a vector x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) 2 f0; 1gI such that
P
i2I xi =
1. The set of assignment vectors is denoted by X, i.e., X ´ fx 2 f0; 1gI :P
i2I xi = 1g. A monetary transfer vector is a vector t = (t1; t2; : : : ; tn) 2 RI
such that
P
i2I ti · 0. The set of monetary transfer vectors is denoted by T , i.e.,
T ´ ft 2 RI :Pi2I ti · 0g. An allocation (x; t) is a pair of vectors: an assignment
vector x 2 X and a monetary transfer vector t 2 T . Let A ´ X£T be the set of al-
locations. Further, let (x; t) = (xi; ti)i2I 2 A. (xi; ti) denotes agent i’s consumption
bundle.
A mechanism Ã : VI ! A is a function that associates each valuation profile v 2
VI with an allocation Ã(v) = (Ãi(v))i2I = (xi(v); ti(v))i2I 2 A. Two mechanisms
Ã and Á are equivalent almost everywhere if the probability measure of the set
fv 2 VI : Ã(v) 6= Á(v)g is equal to zero. Ã and Á are welfare equivalent if for each
v 2 VI and each i 2 I, u(Ãi(v); vi) = u(Ái(v); vi).
3
3.2 Properties of mechanisms
In this paper, we are mainly interested with the following three properties: envy-
freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive compatibility.
We first introduce our fairness requirement. Envy-freeness states that every
agents weakly prefers his own consumption to that of any other agent (Foley, 1967).
Envy-freeness: A mechanism Ã is envy-free if for each v 2 VI and each i; j 2 I,
u(Ãi(v); vi) ¸ u(Ãj(v); vi).
We also require that no money should be wasted.
Budget balancedness: A mechanism Ã is budget balanced if for each v 2 VI ,P
i2I ti(v) = 0.
The existence of envy-free and budget balanced mechanisms is guaranteed by the
result of Alkan, Demange, and Gale (1991). The following proposition (Tadenuma
and Thomson, 1995) identifies the set of such mechanisms in our model. For each
v = (v1; v2; : : : ; vn) 2 VI and each k = 1; 2; : : : ; n, let vk be the kth highest valuation
among v.13
Proposition 1. A mechanism Ã is envy-free and budget balanced if and only if for
each v 2 VI , letting xj(v) = 1
vj = v
1;X
i2I
ti(v) = 0;
v2
n
· ti(v) = th(v) · v
1
n
8 i; h 2 I n fjg:
Proof. We only prove the “only if” part. Let Ã be an envy-free and budget balanced
mechanism and v 2 VI be a valuation profile. By envy-freeness, ti(v) = th(v) for
each i; h 2 I n fjg. Let t¯ ´ ti(v) for each i 2 I n fjg. By budget balancedness,
tj(v) = ¡(n¡1)t¯. Since j and each i 2 Infjg do not envy each other, vj+tj(v) ¸ t¯,
and t¯ ¸ vi + tj(v). Therefore, we have that vj ¸ vi and vin · t¯ · vjn .
Proposition 1 implies that under budget balancedness, envy-freeness is a refine-
ment of efficiency (Svensson, 1983). This relation strengthens our motivation to
search for an incentive compatible mechanism that satisfies the fairness property.
We next introduce our incentive compatibility condition. Bayesian incentive
compatibility states that for each agent, a truthful revelation of his valuation max-
imizes his expected payoff given that all other agents report their own preferences
truthfully.
13For example, if v1 ¸ v2 ¸ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¸ vn, then vk = vk for each k = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
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Bayesian incentive compatibility: A mechanism Ã is Bayesian incentive com-
patible if for each i 2 I and vi 2 V ,Z
V¡i
u(Ãi(vi; v¡i); vi)f¡i(v¡i)dv¡i ¸
Z
V¡i
u(Ãi(v
0
i; v¡i); vi)f¡i(v¡i)dv¡i;
for all v0i 2 V .
In addition to the three properties, we formulate order additivity as an auxiliary
property. It requires that monetary transfers (i) depend only on vk; k = 1; 2; : : : ; n
and (ii) are additively separable with respect to them. For each v 2 VI and each
k = 1; 2; : : : ; n, let k(v) 2 I be an agent with the kth highest valuation among v,
i.e., vk(v) = v
k.
Order additivity: A mechanism Ã is order additive if there exist differentiable
functions ¿ k` : V ! R, k; ` = 1; 2; : : : ; n such that for each v 2 VI and for each
` = 1; 2; : : : ; n, t`(v)(v) = ¿
1
` (v
1) + ¿ 2` (v
2) + ¢ ¢ ¢+ ¿n` (vn).
Under order additivity, monetary transfers are independent of the names of
agents. Therefore, it can be interpreted as a kind of anonymity condition. Many of
mechanisms in related literature satisfy the property. In the following, we present
examples of such mechanisms.
Examples of order additive mechanisms : First-price and second-price auction
mechanisms obviously satisfy order additivity because monetary transfers depend
only on v1 or v2.
Given ¸ 2 [0; 1], let Ã¸ be a mechanism such that for each v 2 VI , letting
x¸j (v) = 1,
vj = v
1;
t¸i (v) =
8>>><>>>:
¡n¡ 1
n
((1¡ ¸)v1 + ¸v2) if i = j
1
n
((1¡ ¸)v1 + ¸v2) if i 2 I n fjg:
It is obvious that Ã¸ satisfies order additivity.14 When ¸ = 0, it is an equal welfare
mechanism (Tadenuma and Thomson, 1993) in which each agent enjoys the equal
utility v
1
n
.
A mechanism ÃE is an expected externality mechanism (Arrow, 1979; d’Aspremont
and Ge´rard-Varet, 1979) if for each v 2 VI , letting xEj (v) = 1,
vj = v
1;
tEi (v) = Ev¡i [W¡i(vi; v¡i)]¡
1
n¡ 1
X
h 6=i
Ev¡h [W¡h(vh; v¡h)] for each i 2 I;
14Any Ã¸ obviously satisfies envy-freeness and budget balancedness but does not satisfy Bayesian
incentive compatibility (Gu¨th and van Damme, 1986; Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer, 1987).
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where W¡i(v) ´
P
h 6=i vhx
E
h (v) for each i 2 I and Ev¡i [ ¢ ] denotes the expectation
operator with respect to v¡i.15 We can verify that it is order additive by defining
for each ` = 1; 2; : : : ; n,
¿ `` (v
`) = Ev¡`(v)
£
W¡`(v)(v`; v¡`(v))
¤
¿ k` (v
k) = ¡ 1
n¡ 1Ev¡k(v)
£
W¡k(v)(vk; v¡k(v))
¤
for each k 6= `:
Other examples are follows: a mechanism in McAfee and McMillan (1992) that
is implemented through the first-price knockout preauction16 and a mechanism as-
sociated with a Shapley allocation (Shapley, 1953; Littlechild and Owen, 1973).
4 Double cumulation mechanism
Our purpose is to design a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balanced-
ness, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. For simplicity, we restrict our attention
to the class of order additive mechanisms.
For our purpose, we first examine the implications of the attractive proper-
ties. The following lemma states that if an order additive mechanism satisfies envy-
freeness and budget balancedness, it has a considerably simpler monetary transfer
scheme. The proof of the lemma can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. If an order additive mechanism Ã satisfies envy-freeness and budget
balancedness, then there are two functions ¿ 1 : V ! R and ¿ 2 : V ! R that satisfy
the following: for each v 2 VI and each i 2 I such that xi(v) = 0,
ti(v) = ¿
1(v1) + ¿ 2(v2):
We next establish that under order additivity, the following mechanisms are the
only candidates for desirable mechanisms. We term these double cumulation mech-
anisms since the monetary transfers depend on the cumulation of the cumulative
distribution function of each agent’s valuation,
R vi
v
F (w)dw. Note that later, we will
also establish that any double cumulation mechanism actually satisfies the three
desirable properties.
15ÃE satisfies efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility (Arrow, 1979;d’Aspremont and
Ge´rard-Varet, 1979) but does not satisfy envy-freeness.
16See McAfee and McMillan (1992) for details regarding the first-price knockout pre-auction.
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Double cumulation mechanism: A mechanism Ã is a double cumulation mech-
anism if for each v 2 VI , letting xj(v) = 1,
vj = v
1;
ti(v) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
¡n¡ 1
n
Ã
v1 ¡
Z v1
v2
F (w)dw
!
if i = j
1
n
Ã
v1 ¡
Z v1
v2
F (w)dw
!
if i 2 I n fjg:
The double cumulation mechanism is not unique since the assignment of the
object cannot be uniquely determined by the definition. However, any two double
cumulation mechanisms are equivalent almost everywhere. Further, the mechanisms
are welfare equivalent. Therefore, the double cumulation mechanism is essentially
unique.
Theorem 1. If a mechanism satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, Bayesian
incentive compatibility, and order additivity, then it is a double cumulation mecha-
nism.
Proof. We only prove that for each v 2 VI and each i 2 I such that xi(v) = 0,
ti(v) =
1
n
Ã
v1 ¡
Z v1
v2
F (w)dw
!
:
By Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, for each v 2 VI and each i 2 I such that
xi(v) = 0,
v2
n
· ti(v) = ¿ 1(v1) + ¿ 2(v2) · v
1
n
: (1)
Since the budget is balanced, the accepter pays (n ¡ 1) (¿ 1(v1) + ¿ 2(v2)) in total.
(1) implies that for w 2 V , if v1 = v2 = w,
¿ 1(w) + ¿ 2(w) =
w
n
: (2)
Furthermore, by differentiating (2), we obtain
d¿ 1(w)
dv1
+
d¿ 2(w)
dv2
=
1
n
8w 2 V: (3)
We introduce some definitions. Given i 2 I, let y1 or y2 be the highest or the
second highest order statistic of v1; : : : ; vi¡1; vi+1; : : : ; vn respectively. We denote
G or g as the distribution function or the density function of y1 respectively, i.e.,
7
G(w) ´ F (w)n¡1 and g(w) ´ G0(w) = (n ¡ 1)f(w)F (w)n¡2 for each w 2 V . Let
f(y1; y2) denote the joint density function of y1 and y2, i.e.,
f(y1; y2) = (n¡ 1)(n¡ 2)f(y1)f(y2)F (y2)n¡3
if y1 ¸ y2, and 0 otherwise.17
Let vˆi 2 V be the true valuation of agent i. We denote U(vi; vˆi) as his expected
utility when he reports vi. The expected utility can be written as follows:
U(vi; vˆi) =
Z
V¡i
u(Ãi(vi; v¡i); vˆi)f¡i(v¡i)dv¡i
=
Z vi
v
Z y1
v
[vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1)(¿ 1(vi) + ¿ 2(y1))]f(y1; y2)dy2dy1
+
Z v
vi
Z vi
v
(¿ 1(y1) + ¿
2(vi))f(y1; y2)dy2dy1
+
Z v
vi
Z y1
vi
(¿ 1(y1) + ¿
2(y2))f(y1; y2)dy2dy1: (4)
By differentiating (4), we have that
d
dvi
U(vi; vˆi) = ¡(n¡ 1)d¿
1(vi)
dv1
G(vi) +
d¿ 2(vi)
dv2
(n¡ 1)(1¡ F (vi))F (vi)n¡2
+
³
vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1)vi
n
´
g(vi)¡ vi
n
g(vi): (5)
The derivation of (5) can be found in the Appendix. (5) and Bayesian incentive
compatibility together imply that
d
dvi
U(vˆi; vˆi) = ¡(n¡ 1)d¿
1(vˆi)
dv1
G(vˆi) +
d¿ 2(vˆi)
dv2
(n¡ 1)(1¡ F (vˆi))F (vˆi)n¡2
+
µ
vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1) vˆi
n
¶
g(vˆi)¡ vˆi
n
g(vˆi)
= ¡(n¡ 1)d¿
1(vˆi)
dv1
G(vˆi) +
d¿ 2(vˆi)
dv2
(n¡ 1)(1¡ F (vˆi))F (vˆi)n¡2 = 0: (6)
It is interesting that the F.O.C. (6) depends only on the two terms that represent
the expected changes of monetary transfers due to a slight increase of the agent’s
report. This fact will be thoroughly discussed in Remark 1.
From (3) and (6), it follows that for each vˆi 2 V ,
d¿ 1(vˆi)
dv1
=
1
n
(1¡ F (vˆi)) and d¿
2(vˆi)
dv2
=
1
n
F (vˆi):
17See Hogg and Craig (1995, pp.193–203) for the definition of the joint density function of y1
and y2.
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Further, we obtain
¿ 1(vˆi) = ¿
1(v) +
1
n
Z vˆi
v
(1¡ F (w)) dw = ¿ 1(v)¡ v
n
+
1
n
µ
vˆi ¡
Z vˆi
v
F (w)dw
¶
;
¿ 2(vˆi) = ¿
2(v) +
1
n
Z vˆi
v
F (w)dw:
Therefore, for each v 2 VI and each i 2 I such that xi(v) = 0,
ti(v) = ¿
1(v)¡ v
n
+
1
n
Ã
v1 ¡
Z v1
v
F (w)dw
!
+ ¿ 2(v) +
1
n
Z v2
v
F (w)dw
=
1
n
Ã
v1 ¡
Z v1
v2
F (w)dw
!
:
where the second equality is obtained by (2).
Remark 1. In this remark, we would like to discuss why the F.O.C. (6) depends
only on the two terms. We first examine the derivative of U(vi; vˆi), (5):
d
dvi
U(vi; vˆi) = ¡(n¡ 1)d¿
1(vi)
dv1
G(vi) +
d¿ 2(vi)
dv2
(n¡ 1)(1¡ F (vi))F (vi)n¡2
+
³
vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1)vi
n
´
g(vi)¡ vi
n
g(vi): (5)
A slight increase of the agent’s report vi causes two types of changes: (i) a change in
monetary transfers and (ii) a change in the order of vi. The first or second term of (5)
represents the expected change in monetary transfers when his report is the highest
or the second highest respectively. The third and fourth terms of (5) represent the
expected gains or losses due to a change in the order of his report. When y1 is just
equal to vi, his report can become the highest valuation by the slight increase of it.
Therefore, he slightly increases the chance that his report is the highest. He then
receives the object and pays vi
n
to each non-accepter by envy-freeness. The third
term represents the expected utility due to the slight increase of the chance that vi
is the highest. On the other hand, at the same event, his report vi cannot be the
second highest valuation by the slight increase. Therefore, he slightly decreases the
chance that his report is the second highest. He then only receives vi
n
units of money
from the accepter by envy-freeness. The fourth term represents the expected utility
due to the slight decrease of the chance that vi is the second highest. By (5) and
Bayesian incentive compatibility,
d
dvi
U(vˆi; vˆi) = ¡(n¡ 1)d¿
1(vˆi)
dv1
G(vˆi) +
d¿ 2(vˆi)
dv2
(n¡ 1)(1¡ F (vˆi))F (vˆi)n¡2
+
µ
vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1) vˆi
n
¶
g(vˆi)¡ vˆi
n
g(vˆi)
= ¡(n¡ 1)d¿
1(vˆi)
dv1
G(vˆi) +
d¿ 2(vˆi)
dv2
(n¡ 1)(1¡ F (vˆi))F (vˆi)n¡2 = 0: (6)
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The two effects by the changes of vˆi’s order are offset because he enjoys
vˆi
n
utility at
each event by envy-freeness. Therefore, the F.O.C. depends only on the expected
changes of monetary transfers.
Any double cumulation mechanism obviously satisfies order additivity, and in
fact, the three desirable properties as well.
Theorem 2. Any double cumulation mechanism satisfies envy-freeness, budget bal-
ancedness, and Bayesian incentive compatibility.
Proof. Let Ã be a double cumulation mechanism. Ã obviously satisfies budget bal-
ancedness.
(Envy-freeness) Since v1 ¸ v2, it holds that 0 · R v1
v2
F (w)dw · v1¡v2. This implies
that for each i 2 I such that xi(v) = 0,
v2
n
=
v1
n
¡ 1
n
(v1 ¡ v2) · v
1
n
¡ 1
n
Z v1
v2
F (w)dw = ti(v) · v
1
n
:
Therefore, by Proposition 1, Ã satisfies envy-freeness.
(Bayesian incentive compatibility) For each z 2 V , let
µ1(z) ´ 1
n
µ
z ¡
Z z
v
F (w)dw
¶
and µ2(z) ´ 1
n
Z z
v
F (w)dw:
Ã satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and order additivity ; hence, from an
argument similar to that in Theorem 1, it follows that
d
dvi
U(vi; vˆi) = ¡(n¡ 1)dµ
1(vi)
dv1
G(vi) +
dµ2(vi)
dv2
(n¡ 1)(1¡ F (vi))F (vi)n¡2
+
³
vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1)vi
n
´
g(vi)¡ vi
n
g(vi)
= (vˆi ¡ vi)g(vi):
where the second equality is obtained by dµ
1(vi)
dv1
= 1
n
(1¡ F (vi)) and dµ2(vi)dv2 = 1nF (vi).
Therefore, we have that
d
dvi
U(vˆi; vˆi) = (vˆi ¡ vˆi)g(vˆi) = 0;
d2
dv2i
U(vˆi; vˆi) = (vˆi ¡ vˆi)g0(vˆi)¡ g0(vˆi) = ¡g0(vˆi) < 0:
Thus, Ã satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility.
We can immediately establish the following characterization theorem on the basis
of Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 3. A mechanism satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, Bayesian
incentive compatibility, and order additivity if and only if it is a double cumulation
mechanism.
As we stated above, the double cumulation mechanism is essentially unique.
Therefore, Theorem 3 indicates that under order additivity, a mechanism that sat-
isfies the desirable properties is essentially unique.
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5 Extension
In the preceding sections, we consider the problem with one indivisible object. In
this section, we discuss the problem where there are several homogenous indivis-
ible objects. Our results in the previous section can be applied to the problem
straightforwardly.18
We assume that there arem (1 · m < n) units of homogeneous indivisible object
to be allocated and each agent consumes at most one object. In this setting, an
assignment vector is a vector x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) 2 f0; 1gI such that
P
i2I xi = m.
The following proposition is obtained from Lemma 2 in Bochet and Sakai (2007).19
Proposition 2. A mechanism Ã is envy-free and budget balanced if and only if for
each v 2 VI , letting I®(v) ´ fi 2 I : xi(v) = 1g,
vi ¸ vm ¸ vj 8 i 2 I®(v); 8 j 2 I n I®(v);X
i2I
ti(v) = 0;
ti(v) = tj(v) 8 i; j 2 I®(v);
m
n
vm+1 · ti(v) = tj(v) · m
n
vm 8 i; j 2 I n I®(v):
The following lemma follows from an argument similar to Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. If an order additive mechanism Ã satisfies envy-freeness and budget
balancedness, then there are two functions ¿m : V ! R and ¿m+1 : V ! R that
satisfy the following: for each v 2 VI , letting I®(v) ´ fi 2 I : xi(v) = 1g,
ti(v) = ¿
m(vm) + ¿m+1(vm+1) 8 i 2 I n I®(v):
We can also establish that the double cumulation mechanisms are the only ones
that satisfy the four properties: a mechanism Ã is a double cumulation mechanism
if for each v 2 VI , letting I®(v) ´ fi 2 I : xi(v) = 1g,
vi ¸ vm ¸ vj 8 i 2 I®(v); 8 j 2 I n I®(v)
ti(v) =
8>>>><>>>>:
¡n¡m
n
µ
vm ¡
Z vm
vm+1
F (w)dw
¶
if i 2 I®(v)
m
n
µ
vm ¡
Z vm
vm+1
F (w)dw
¶
if i 2 I n I®(v):
Theorem 4. In the case where there are several homogenous indivisible objects, a
mechanism satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, Bayesian incentive compat-
ibility, and order additivity if and only if it is a double cumulation mechanism.
18The author would like to thank Minoru Kitahara for pointing out this fact. Discussions in this
section are based on his comments.
19See Bochet and Sakai (2007) for the details of the proof.
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Proof. We only prove the “only if” part. Let Ã be a mechanism that satisfies the
four properties. By Proposition 2 and Lemma 2, for each v 2 VI and each w 2 V ,
if vm = vm+1 = w,
¿m(w) + ¿m+1(w) =
m
n
w:
By differentiating this, we have that
d¿m(w)
dvm
+
d¿m+1(w)
dvm+1
=
m
n
: (7)
Similar to the discussion in Remark 1, we can see that the F.O.C. depends only on
the expected change of monetary transfers. Therefore,
d
dvi
U(vˆi; vˆi) = ¡n¡m
m
d¿m(vˆi)
dvm
(n¡ 1)!
(m¡ 1)!(n¡m)!(1¡ F (vˆi))
m¡1F (vˆi)n¡m
+
d¿m+1(vˆi)
dvm+1
(n¡ 1)!
m!(n¡m¡ 1)!(1¡ F (vˆi))
mF (vˆi)
n¡m¡1 = 0 (8)
where (n¡1)!
(m¡1)!(n¡m)!(1 ¡ F (vˆi))m¡1F (vˆi)n¡m or (n¡1)!m!(n¡m¡1)!(1 ¡ F (vˆi))mF (vˆi)n¡m¡1 is
the probability that vˆi is the mth or (m + 1)th highest valuation, respectively. By
(7) and (8), we can obtain that for each v 2 VI and each i 2 I such that xi(v) = 0,
ti(v) = ¿
m(vm) + ¿m+1(vm+1) =
m
n
µ
vm ¡
Z vm
vm+1
F (w)dw
¶
:
Therefore, Ã is a double cumulation mechanism.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object
when monetary transfers are possible. We established the existence of a Bayesian
incentive compatible mechanism to solve the problem and the uniqueness of the
mechanism under an additive separability condition. This is a positive result in
contrast to various impossibility results on strategy-proofness although we consider
a weaker incentive compatibility condition.
In this paper, we restrict our analysis to the class of order additive mechanisms.
We have not found a non order additive mechanism that satisfies the three main
properties. It is a very interesting question whether there is a desirable mechanism
that is not order additive.
The double cumulation mechanism relies on the distribution function of each
agent’s valuation, F . Therefore, it is not a simple mechanism, which is one that
does not depend on a specific information of the environment (Cramton, Gibbons,
and Klemperer, 1987; McAfee, 1992). It is interesting to address an issue of design-
ing a simple direct or indirect mechanism to achieve fair division in a model with
incomplete information.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
For each v 2 VI , let t¯(v) be the amount of money that each non-accepter receives.
By order additivity, there exist functions ¿ k : V ! R, k = 1; 2; : : : ; n such that for
each v 2 VI , t¯(v) = ¿ 1(v1) + ¿ 2(v2) + ¢ ¢ ¢ + ¿n(vn). From Proposition 1, it follows
that for each v 2 VI ,
v2
n
· t¯(v) = ¿ 1(v1) + ¿ 2(v2) + ¢ ¢ ¢+ ¿n(vn) · v
1
n
: (9)
For each w;w0 2 V , let us consider the valuation profiles v = (v; v; : : : ; v; w) and
v0 = (v; v; : : : ; v; w0). By (9),
t¯(v) = ¿
1(v) + ¿ 2(v) + ¢ ¢ ¢+ ¿n¡1(v) + ¿n(w) = v
n
t¯(v
0) = ¿ 1(v) + ¿ 2(v) + ¢ ¢ ¢+ ¿n¡1(v) + ¿n(w0) = v
n
:
These imply that ¿n(w) = ¿n(w0) for each w;w0 2 V . Therefore, ¿n is constant, i.e.,
¿n(w) = cn 2 R for each w 2 V . By repeating similar arguments, we can obtain
that for each k = 3; 4; : : : ; n¡ 1, ¿ k is constant, i.e., ¿ k(w) = ck 2 R for each w 2 V .
Thus, for each v 2 VI ,
t¯(v) = ¿
1(v1) + ¿ 2(v2) +
nX
k=3
ck:
¤
Derivation of (5)
Let
U1(vi; vˆi) ´
Z vi
v
Z y1
v
[vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1)(¿ 1(vi) + ¿ 2(y1))]f(y1; y2)dy2dy1
U2(vi; vˆi) ´
Z v
vi
Z vi
v
(¿ 1(y1) + ¿
2(vi))f(y1; y2)dy2dy1
U3(vi; vˆi) ´
Z v
vi
Z y1
vi
(¿ 1(y1) + ¿
2(y2))f(y1; y2)dy2dy1:
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Recall that by (2), for each w 2 V, ¿ 1(w)+¿ 2(w) = w
n
. We can obtain the followings:
d
dvi
U1(vi; vˆi) =
Z vi
v
@
@vi
·Z y1
v
£
vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1)
¡
¿ 1(vi) + ¿
2(y1)
¢¤
f(y1; y2)dy2
¸
dy1
+
Z vi
v
£
vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1)
¡
¿ 1(vi) + ¿
2(vi)
¢¤
f(vi; y2)dy2
=
Z vi
v
Z y1
v
@
@vi
h £
vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1)
¡
¿ 1(vi) + ¿
2(y1)
¢¤
f(y1; y2)
i
dy2dy1
+
Z vi
v
h
vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1)vi
n
i
f(vi; y2)dy2
= ¡(n¡ 1)d¿
1(vi)
dv1
Z vi
v
Z y1
v
f(y1; y2)dy2dy1 +
³
vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1)vi
n
´
g(vi)
= ¡(n¡ 1)d¿
1(vi)
dv1
G(vi) +
³
vˆi ¡ (n¡ 1)vi
n
´
g(vi): (10)
d
dvi
U2(vi; vˆi)
=
Z v
vi
@
@vi
·Z vi
v
(¿ 1(y1) + ¿
2(vi))f(y1; y2)dy2
¸
dy1 ¡
Z vi
v
(¿ 1(vi) + ¿
2(vi))f(vi; y2)dy2
=
Z v
vi
·Z vi
v
@
@vi
³
(¿ 1(y1) + ¿
2(vi))f(y1; y2)
´
dy2 + (¿
1(y1) + ¿
2(vi))f(y1; vi)
¸
dy1 ¡ vi
n
g(vi)
=
d¿ 2(vi)
dv2
Z v
vi
Z vi
v
f(y1; y2)dy2dy1 +
Z v
vi
(¿ 1(y1) + ¿
2(vi))f(y1; vi)dy1 ¡ vi
n
g(vi)
=
d¿ 2(vi)
dv2
(n¡ 1)(1¡ F (vi))F (vi)n¡2 +
Z v
vi
(¿ 1(y1) + ¿
2(vi))f(y1; vi)dy1 ¡ vi
n
g(vi)
(11)
d
dvi
U3(vi; vˆi)
=
Z v
vi
@
@vi
·Z y1
vi
(¿ 1(y1) + ¿
2(y2))f(y1; y2)dy2
¸
dy1 ¡
Z vi
vi
(¿ 1(vi) + ¿
2(y2))f(vi; y2)dy2
=
Z v
vi
·Z y1
vi
@
@vi
³
(¿ 1(y1) + ¿
2(y2))f(y1; y2)
´
dy2 ¡ (¿ 1(y1) + ¿ 2(vi))f(y1; vi)
¸
dy1
= ¡
Z v
vi
(¿ 1(y1) + ¿
2(vi))f(y1; vi)dy1 (12)
Therefore, (5) immediately follows from (10), (11), and (12). ¥
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